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Abstract 
Many find it intuitive that having been manipulated undermines a person's free will. Some have 
objected to accounts of free will like Harry Frankfurt's (according to which free will depends 
only on an agent's psychological structure at the time of action) by arguing that it is possible 
for manipulated agents, who are intuitively unfree, to satisfy Frankfurt's allegedly sufficient 
conditions for freedom. Drawing resources from Greg Egan's "Reasons to Be Cheerful" as well 
as from stories of psychologically sophisticated artificial intelligence (such as Isaac Asimov's 
"The Bicentennial Man"), I rebut this objection to "structuralist" accounts of free will, arguing 
that the very possibility of free will for persons like us requires that we admit that a person can 
be free even when lacking control over the character from which she acts. I conclude with some 
implications for the freedom and personhood of artificial intelligences. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
One feature of persons—arguably a distinctive feature of persons—is their capacity 
for acting with freedom of the will. According to Harry Frankfurt’s (1971) influential 
account, acting from a will that is free is a matter of having a certain sort of 
psychological structure at the time of action, specifically one in which a person not 
only has the desire to perform an action but also has a second desire that the first 
desire be effective in leading to action. Since Frankfurt’s account says acting with free 
will is a matter of having a certain sort of psychological structure at the time of action, 
the account is a “structuralist” one.1 A popular objection to Frankfurt’s account (and 
to structuralist accounts more generally) is that it is possible for the account’s alleged 
sufficient conditions on free will to be satisfied by agents who have been manipulated 
and who thus (because of the manipulation) appear unfree. For example, if we were 
to discover that a person who committed some heinous deed had recently been 
brainwashed into thinking that the heinous deed was the best course of action, many 
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of us would be disposed to say that this person was not free even if this agent had, say, 
a desire that the desire to commit the heinous deed be effective. It would seem, then, 
that whether one acts with free will (and thus satisfies an important condition on 
being a person) is partly a matter of how one came to perform the action in question, 
not merely a matter of having a certain psychological structure at the time of action. 
While not a case of manipulation per se, Greg Egan creates a relevantly similar 
scenario in his short story, “Reasons to Be Cheerful” (1998). Late in the story, Mark 
(the narrator) undergoes a procedure that results in a psychological profile 
(including desires and preferences) that is influenced not by his own past choices, 
character, and preferences, but rather by the amalgamation of four thousand 
contributing networks (the psychological profiles of four thousand deceased human 
beings). Not long after receiving this psychological profile, Mark uses the technology 
he’s been given to choose to fall in love with another character, Julia, and he does fall 
in love with her. At the time of choosing Julia, Mark satisfies the conditions on 
Frankfurt’s account of free will, yet Mark expresses the very worry that philosophers 
have raised for accounts like Frankfurt’s, namely that, in his case, it isn’t really him 
that chose Julia, given the influence of others’ psychological profiles on his own. Later 
on, however, Mark also explores a type of response to the worry about such external 
influence on his behavior; while his case may seem extraordinary, in relevant 
respects he is no different from an ordinary person, who must “carve a life out of the 
same legacy,” namely the legacy of natural selection, parental and societal influence, 
and other shaping factors. 
In this essay, I will develop this latter suggestion of Mark’s into a full-fledged 
response to the manipulation objection to accounts of free will like Frankfurt’s. I will 
argue that, although cases of manipulation (and scenarios like Mark’s) may appear at 
first glance to preclude freedom, any account according to which we may become free 
persons must allow that we can act with free will even when acting from 
psychological profiles over which we had no control. More specifically, since each of 
us (ordinary human beings) began to exist, and since we lacked control over our 
psychological profiles at the start of our careers as agents, we are not relevantly 
different (at certain parts of our lives) from manipulated agents (or from agents like 
Mark). And insofar as we take our capacity to act with freedom of the will to be a 
centrally important feature of persons, it is crucial that, in order to have an adequate 
account of free will, we must allow for freedom in cases like Mark’s. 
I will proceed as follows. In the next section, section 2, I will summarize the 
details of Frankfurt’s theory of freedom. Then, in section 3, I will fill out the objection 
to Frankfurt’s account that I mentioned above, namely the threat from manipulation. 
In section 4, I will provide a brief recap of the plot of Egan’s “Reasons to Be Cheerful” 
and will discuss the more general theme, pervasive in science fiction, of the freedom 
(or lack of freedom) enjoyed by artificial intelligences that are designed to satisfy 
conditions like those of Frankfurt’s theory of freedom. Finally, in section 5, drawing 
resources from the examples from science fiction, I will argue that the threat from 
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manipulation fails to undermine accounts of freedom like Frankfurt’s. I conclude by 
briefly summarizing my response to that objection and by considering the 
implications for the freedom and personhood of artificial intelligences. 
2. A Theory of Freedom (and Personhood) 
According to Frankfurt, “one essential difference between persons and other 
creatures is to be found in the structure of a person’s will” (1971, 6).2 While many 
creatures have wants and desires to act (or to omit to act) in various ways, Frankfurt 
thinks that persons have the capacity to want or desire to have (or not to have) 
certain wants or desires to act in various ways. Desires of the first sort are “first-
order desires,” and these take such things as courses of action as their object. A 
person’s “will,” according to Frankfurt is to be identified with certain first-order 
desires, namely those that are effective in bringing about a person’s action. Desires of 
the second type, “second-order desires,” take first-order desires as their object, either 
by desiring to have a certain first-order desire or by desiring that a certain first-order 
desire bring about an action. For example, although a person may lack the first-order 
desire to exercise, she may nevertheless have the second-order desire that she have 
the desire to exercise. For another example, a person may have conflicting first-order 
desires, such as the desire to exercise now and the desire to relax now, and she may 
have the second order desire that the desire to exercise be effective. In Frankfurt’s 
view, this capacity for second-order desires about which first-order desires are 
effective is a distinctive feature of persons, and we can understand what it is for a 
person to act with freedom of the will by reference to the structure of the person’s 
will. 
What is it, then, on Frankfurt’s account, for a person to act with freedom of the 
will? Frankfurt offers the following summary of his view: 
A person’s will is free only if he is free to have the will he wants. This means 
that, with regard to any of his first-order desires, he is free either to make that 
desire his will or to make some other first-order desire his will instead. 
Whatever his will, then, the will of the person whose will is free could have 
been otherwise; he could have done otherwise than to constitute his will as he 
did. (Frankfurt 1971, 18–19) 
As long as a person is free in choosing which of her first-order desires will lead her to 
action, the person acts with free will when the selected first-order desire brings about 
the action. So, on Frankfurt’s account, if I desire that my desire for coffee lead me to 
the action of ordering coffee (rather than, say, my desire for tea leading me to the 
incompatible action of ordering tea), and if my desire for coffee is effective in bringing 
me to ordering some, then I count as acting from free will in ordering my coffee. The 
conditions of Frankfurt’s account pertain only to the internal structure of an agent, 
and the conditions are sufficient, Frankfurt thinks, for acting with free will. 
Taylor W. Cyr: Carving a Life From Legacy 
 
Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy  Vol. 1: 2018 
 
 
 
4 
One especially important feature of Frankfurt’s theory of freedom (a feature 
shared by all structuralist accounts) is that a person’s history makes no difference as 
to whether the person acts with free will. Instead, on this type of account, all that 
matters for freedom is the person’s psychological structure at the time of action. This 
feature of the account gives rise to the worry that certain persons who intuitively lack 
freedom may nevertheless satisfy Frankfurt’s sufficient conditions on acting from free 
will. Let us turn now to this objection. 
3. The Threat from Manipulation 
As we have already seen, Frankfurt’s sufficient conditions on free will make no 
reference to how a person comes to have the psychological structure specified by the 
account’s conditions. An implication of this, which Frankfurt himself notes, is that 
“some agency other than a person’s own [may be] responsible (even morally 
responsible) for the fact that he enjoys or fails to enjoy freedom of the will” (1971, 
20). But a popular worry for views like Frankfurt’s arises because of this implication. 
To see the worry, consider the following story of covert manipulation, adapted 
from stories told in various places by Alfred Mele (see, e.g., Mele 2016, 72–74): 
Beth is an exceptionally sweet person, though she was not always that way. 
When she was in high school, she came to view herself, with some justification, 
as self-centered, petty, and somewhat cruel. She worked hard to improve her 
character over the course of several years, and she succeeded. 
Chuck, by contrast, enjoyed torturing animals as a young boy, but he was 
not wholeheartedly behind this. These activities sometimes caused him to feel 
guilty, he experienced bouts of squeamishness, and he occasionally considered 
abandoning animal torture. However, Chuck valued being the sort of person 
who does as he pleases and who unambivalently rejects conventional morality 
as a system designed for and by weaklings. He set out to ensure that he would 
be wholeheartedly behind his torturing of animals and related activities, 
including his merciless bullying of vulnerable people, and he succeeded. 
When Beth crawled into bed last night she was an exceptionally sweet 
person, but she awakes with a desire to stalk and kill a neighbor, George. 
Although she had always found George unpleasant, she is very surprised by 
this desire. What happened is that, while Beth slept, a team of psychologists 
that had discovered the system of values that make Chuck tick implanted those 
values in Beth after erasing hers. They did this while leaving her memory 
intact, which helps account for her surprise. Beth reflects on her new desire. 
Among other things, she judges, rightly, that it is utterly in line with her 
system of values. She also judges that she finally sees the light about 
morality—that it is a system designed for and by weaklings. Upon reflection, 
Beth has no reservations about her desire to kill George, is wholeheartedly 
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behind it, and desires that her desire to kill George be effective. That desire is 
effective, and Beth succeeds in killing George. 
In this story, the manipulators (the team of psychologists) not only succeed in getting 
Beth to kill her neighbor, George, but they also succeed in getting Beth to do this from 
a will that counts as free, according to Frankfurt’s theory of freedom.3 Upon hearing 
this story, however, many find it counterintuitive that Beth acts with free will. What 
cases like this show, according to Mele and others, is that freedom (and moral 
responsibility) is in some sense history-bound; for a person to act with free will, she 
must lack a history like Beth’s—one in which the person has been manipulated in a 
certain way.4 But since Beth satisfies Frankfurt’s conditions on free will, the objector 
concludes, this case of manipulation is a counterexample to Frankfurt’s account. 
Before turning to how these types of cases are explored in Egan’s story and in 
other works of science fiction, it is worth noting that cases of manipulation have also 
been used in the recently popular “manipulation argument” against compatibilism.5 
Compatibilism says that our being free is compatible with our being causally 
determined to act as we do by factors beyond our control.6 According to the 
manipulation argument, agents who are manipulated lack freedom, yet there is no 
relevant difference between manipulated agents and ordinary agents who are 
causally determined by factors beyond their control, and thus compatibilism is false. 
If this argument is successful, not only compatibilist accounts that are structuralist 
(like Frankfurt’s) would be undermined, but so too would historicist compatibilist 
accounts be undermined. In my defense of Frankfurt’s account against the threat from 
manipulation below (in section 5), I will also suggest a response to this manipulation 
argument against compatibilism. 
4. “Manipulated” Agents in Science Fiction 
In Egan’s “Reasons to Be Cheerful,” Mark describes for us how, at the age of twelve, it 
is discovered that he has a potentially fatal brain tumor. Strangely enough, however, 
the tumor is causing pressure within Mark’s brain (by blocking a ventricle), which is 
itself causing, in addition to some unpleasant symptoms like vomiting, “elevated 
levels of a substance called Leu-enkephalin—an endorphin, a neuropeptide which is 
bound to some of the same receptors as opiates like morphine and heroin” (Egan, 
192). As a result, Mark is in a state of almost complete happiness, yet unless the 
tumor is removed, he will not survive. 
Mark’s parents arrange for him to undergo treatment to get rid of the tumor, 
and the procedure is successful. Even after seeing the test results showing that he is 
in the clear, however, Mark experiences nothing but a deep sadness after the removal 
of the tumor. “Everything I did,” Mark tells us, “everything I imagined, was tainted 
with an overwhelming sense of dread and shame.” Mark continues: 
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The only image I could summon up for comparison was from a documentary 
about Auschwitz that I’d seen at school. It had opened with a long tracking 
shot, a newsreel camera advancing relentlessly towards the gates of the camp, 
and I’d watched that scene with my spirits sinking, already knowing full well 
what had happened inside. I wasn’t delusional; I didn’t believe for a moment 
that there was some source of unspeakable evil lurking behind every bright 
surface around me. But when I woke and saw the sky, I felt the kind of sick 
foreboding that would only have made sense if I’d been staring at the gates of 
Auschwitz. (197) 
As it turns out, Mark’s state of constant depression is the result of neurological 
damage, and nothing can be done for him for nearly two decades, until he is contacted 
by Dr. Durrani. 
Durrani leaves a message for Mark explaining the treatment she has developed 
for neurological damage, and Mark recounts hearing the message: 
I listened as carefully as I could while Dr. Durrani explained her work with 
stroke patients. Tissue-cultured neural grafts were the current standard 
treatment, but she’d been injecting an elaborately tailored foam into the 
damaged region instead. The foam released growth factors that attracted 
axons and dendrites from surrounding neurons, and the polymer itself was 
designed to function as a network of electrochemical switches. Via 
microprocessors scattered throughout the foam, the initially amorphous 
network was programmed first to reproduce generically the actions of the lost 
neurons, then fine-tuned for compatibility with the individual recipient. (203) 
The “network” that would act as a prosthetic for the lost neurons would allow Mark 
to experience pleasure again, without the overwhelming sense of dread and sadness 
that he had been experiencing for years. That network would itself be based on the 
neural networks of many cadavers with undamaged brains—four thousand of them, 
to be exact. When Mark asks about the nature of this network, Durrani offers a bit 
more explanation:  
We’ve used about 4,000 records from the database—all males in their 
twenties or thirties—and whenever someone has a neuron A wired to neuron 
B, and someone else has a neuron A wired to neuron C, you’ll have connections 
to both B and C. So you’ll start out with a network that in theory could be 
pared down to any one of the 4,000 individual versions used to construct it, 
but in fact you’ll pare it down to your own unique version instead. (206) 
Without an idea of what it will be like to experience this foreign network, Mark goes 
through with the procedure. 
When he wakes, not only is Mark able to enjoy simple pleasures like the 
warmth of the bedsheets, but he also finds all of the people who gather around him 
stunningly beautiful. When he listens to music of any genre (and of any quality), he 
Taylor W. Cyr: Carving a Life From Legacy 
 
Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy  Vol. 1: 2018 
 
 
 
7 
rates it extremely highly (18 out of 20, or higher). He starts to worry that his tastes 
are not sufficiently discriminating, and he talks to Durrani, who tells him about the 
possibility of using software to allow Mark to “push” the network in one or another 
direction, with the result that he could directly control the degree of pleasure 
experienced in response to various inputs. The software is installed, and Mark begins 
using an imaginary “slider” to adjust his tastes and preferences. Most of his choices 
are motivated by pragmatics: rather than assigning a high degree of pleasure to junk 
food, he chooses “to crave nothing more toxic than fruit” (217); to put on some weight 
without risking a heart attack, he assigns a body type that is lean and wiry a 16 out of 
20. And having been cured of the debilitating depression that had plagued him for 
years, Mark is able to secure a job at a local bookstore. 
In working the bookstore counter, Mark interacts with many customers and 
begins to hope that he can meet someone that he could desire “more than all the rest” 
(Egan, 221). Mark recounts his predicament: “The 4,000 had all loved very different 
people, and the envelope that stretched between their farflung characteristics 
encompassed the species. That was never going to change, until I did something to 
break the symmetry myself” (221–222). And Mark does break the symmetry; after a 
week of adjusting his relevant systems such that he did not take any interest in 
anyone, Mark reverses these adjustments when a woman, Julia, enters the store. Mark 
recollects the experience: 
By the time she’d chosen two books and approached the counter, I was feeling 
half defiantly triumphant, half sick with shame. I’d struck a pure note with the 
network at last; what I felt at the sight of this woman rang true. And if 
everything I’d done to achieve it was calculated, artificial, bizarre and 
abhorrent, I’d had no other way. (222) 
Mark asks Julie out to lunch, and the two begin seeing each other a couple times a 
week, at which point Mark starts reflecting more on what he is doing: 
Visions of Julia filled my head. I wanted to know what she was doing every 
second of the day; I wanted her to be happy, I wanted her to be safe. Why? 
Because I’d chosen her. But…why had I felt compelled to choose anyone? 
Because, in the end, the one thing that most of the donors must have had in 
common was the fact that they’d desired, and cared about, one person above 
all others. Why? That came down to evolution…my emotions had the same 
ancestry as everyone else’s; what more could I ask? (223–224) 
Although, at times, Mark feels like his choosing Julia was artificial, he also reminds 
himself that this is what choosing another person is like for everyone. “People make a 
decision,” Mark muses, “half shaped by chance, to get to know someone; everything 
starts from there” (224). 
Down the line, Mark tells Julia his entire story, including the details about the 
day they met. He apologizes, but Julia responds, “What are you sorry about? You 
chose me. I chose you. It could have been different for both of us. But it wasn’t” (225). 
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The next day, however, upon further reflection, Julia changes her mind, as “she wasn’t 
prepared to carry on a relationship with 4,000 dead men” (226). Mark is devastated, 
and although he can directly control his emotional response to the breakup, he lets 
things run their course. 
At the end of the story, Mark receives a visit from his father, and, looking at his 
father, he takes the occasion to reflect on his condition: 
Watching him, I thought: he’s there inside my head, and my mother too, and 
ten million ancestors, human, proto-human, remote beyond imagining. What 
difference did 4,000 more make? Everyone had to carve a life out of the same 
legacy: half universal, half particular; half sharpened by relentless natural 
selection, half softened by the freedom of chance. I’d just had to face the details 
a little more starkly. (Egan, 227) 
Contrary to his earlier worries that his choosing of Julia was artificial, Mark comes to 
see that no person like us causes herself to exist without being influenced at all by 
legacy. We are all shaped, to some extent, by such factors as our evolutionary history, 
and so we must make choices from characters over which we lack total control. 
Egan’s story presents a thought-provoking case in which a person has direct 
control over one’s own preferences, desires, and perhaps even values and character 
traits. Despite the differences between Mark’s history and the history of typical 
persons like us, who come to form our preferences and values much differently, Mark 
comes to satisfy the conditions on freedom specified by accounts like Frankfurt’s, so 
he counts as acting with free will when he chooses Julia. 
Whereas Mark has (direct) control over aspects of his psychological profile, 
another type of agent, pervasive in science fiction, lacks control over its psychological 
profile, and yet this type of agent is, in a relevant sense, closely related to agents like 
Mark. I am talking, of course, about an artificial intelligence (AI), which is typically 
given its preferences, desires, etc. by its creators. The most interesting examples, for 
our purposes, are those in which an AI is made to satisfy conditions on freedom like 
those specified by accounts like Frankfurt’s. Before turning to a response to the 
manipulation objection to such accounts of freedom, let us briefly consider Isaac 
Asimov’s (1976) exploration of the freedom of an AI in his story, “The Bicentennial 
Man.” 
Artificial intelligences differ in degree of sophistication, but in many stories 
from science fiction they are created to be rather like human beings. Andrew, robot 
and main character of Asimov’s story, longs to be more and more human. Along the 
way, having been a household robot for a number of years, Andrew wishes to become 
a free robot. The following is Asimov’s description of an interchange between a Judge 
and Andrew during the hearing concerning his freedom: 
 [The Judge] said, “Why do you want to be free, Andrew? In what way will this 
matter to you?” 
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Andrew said, “Would you wish to be a slave, your honor?” 
“But you are not a slave. You are a perfectly good robot, a genius of a robot I 
am given to understand, capable of artistic expression that can be matched 
nowhere. What more can you do if you were free?” 
“Perhaps no more than I do now, your honor, but with greater joy. It has 
been said in this courtroom that only a human being can be free. It seems to me 
that only someone who wishes for freedom can be free. I wish for freedom.” 
And it was that that cued the Judge. The crucial sentence in his decision 
was: “There is no right to deny freedom to any object with a mind advanced 
enough to grasp the concept and desire the state.” (Asimov, 144) 
This discussion of Andrew’s “freedom” is political, not metaphysical; that is, what is at 
stake is Andrew’s legal freedom, not whether he has free will (as if the latter could be 
decided in court). Nevertheless, Andrew’s description of his desire for freedom 
strongly suggests that he is a sufficiently sophisticated AI that he satisfies Frankfurt’s 
conditions on free will. Andrew has first-order desires to perform various actions, but 
he also desires that he bring about those actions in a particular way. This suggests 
that he is capable of reflection on his first-order desires and capable of desiring that 
one of his desires leads him to action, which just is what Frankfurt’s account requires 
for free will. And even if one disagreed with Frankfurt about what was necessary for 
freedom, any structuralist account of freedom must admit that an intelligence 
constructed to be relevantly similar to ordinary human persons would not be any less 
free for having been programmed. 
5. Responding to the Threat from Manipulation 
Stories like Egan’s “Reasons to Be Cheerful” and Asimov’s “The Bicentennial Man” 
depict agents with abnormal histories—histories that may seem, at first glance, to be 
more like those of manipulated agents (like Mele’s case of Beth) than like those of 
agents like you and me. But a common theme in these stories—one that is especially 
well-explored in Egan’s story—is that these prima facie differences become less stark 
upon closer investigation. As we begin to reflect on the circumstances in which the 
characters of these stories find themselves, their experiences shed light on a certain 
aspect of the human condition, namely that we are bound to be shaped by legacy. And 
this leads to a response to the threat from manipulation to accounts of free will like 
Frankfurt’s. 
If persons like us ever begin to act with free will (which we must if free will is 
ever to get off the ground, so to speak), then our first of such actions must be from 
characters and preferences over which we did not have any control.7 Presumably we 
perform such actions when we are young, though the exact age does not make a 
difference to the general point I am making. Of course, we typically go about 
performing actions that will shape our characters and preferences, taking ownership 
of some aspects of our initial psychological profile, rejecting others. At the beginning, 
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however, we are relevantly similar to agents like Mark and Andrew—we have been 
“given” a set of desires, dispositions, etc. that we did not select for ourselves. This is 
Mark’s point when he says, “Everyone had to carve a life out of the same legacy: half 
universal, half particular; half sharpened by relentless natural selection, half softened 
by the freedom of chance” (Egan, 227). Given that we are agents with finite pasts, and 
given our lack of control over what we were like at the outset, the possibility of acting 
with free will depends on our being free at times when we acted from characters over 
which we had no control. 
But notice that, once we see that we must allow for free will even in cases in 
which a person has no say over how she came to have the character she has, we must 
also admit that manipulated agents like Beth (from Mele’s case) may act with free will. 
To be sure, Beth appears less free than a typical adult agent, but then again ordinary 
agents appear less free when they start to act with free will. A person’s degree of 
freedom may increase over time as the person reflectively evaluates her starting 
point and begins shaping her psychological profile at later times (which sounds not 
unlike Mark’s project). The point is that, so long as being manipulated does not 
prevent a person from satisfying structural conditions on freedom at the time of 
action, the manipulation does not undermine a person’s freedom even if it diminishes 
her degree of freedom. In any case, we should not judge that manipulated agents like 
Beth lack freedom, contra the objection from manipulation. 
It is worth pausing for a moment to say more about my invocation of degrees 
of freedom. The idea that freedom is a scalar notion (rather than simply a threshold 
notion, where it can simply be either “on” or “off”) is widely accepted. It is common to 
think of freedom as a sort of control (e.g., control over one’s behavior), and it is clear 
that control comes in degrees. For example, whereas a novice tennis player may 
exercise some degree of control over the placement of her serve, a more experienced 
tennis player may possess and exercise a much higher degree of the placement (and 
speed, trajectory, etc.) of her serve. In my view, because manipulated agents like Beth 
have less control over their own constitution (i.e., what they are like after being 
manipulated), they control their post-manipulation behavior to a lesser degree than 
do relevantly similar agents who have not been manipulated. Of course, even agents 
like Beth exercise some control over their conduct after being manipulated, and my 
view is that, insofar as such agent satisfy Frankfurt’s conditions on freedom, they 
meet the threshold requirements for freedom (unlike non-persons). If a 
“manipulator” so altered a person’s psychological profile that the person no longer 
satisfied even Frankfurt’s structuralist conditions on freedom, such “manipulation” 
would indeed undermine the person’s freedom. But the cases of manipulation and 
design that we have been discussing here are importantly different and seem to me 
only to mitigate agents’ freedom. 
This response to the manipulation objection to structuralist accounts of 
freedom may be extended into a response to the manipulation argument against 
compatibilism. Recall that, according to the manipulation argument, agents who are 
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manipulated lack freedom, yet there is no relevant difference between manipulated 
agents and ordinary agents who are causally determined by factors beyond their 
control, and thus compatibilism is false. Given the response to the threat from 
manipulation above, however, insofar as one is inclined to think that agents like us 
can possess free will, one should be prepared to grant that manipulated agents may 
be free, contra the first premise of the manipulation argument against compatibilism.8 
In addition to its plausibility after reflection on the scenarios from Egan’s and 
Asimov’s stories, the response to the threat from manipulation that I have presented 
here is also consonant with Frankfurt’s mature view. Consider the following passage 
from Frankfurt: 
A manipulator may succeed, through his interventions, in providing a person 
not merely with particular feelings and thoughts but with a new character. 
That person is then morally responsible for the choices and the conduct to 
which having this character leads. We are inevitably fashioned and sustained, 
after all, by circumstances over which we have no control. The causes to which 
we are subject may also change us radically, without thereby bringing it about 
that we are not morally responsible agents. It is irrelevant whether those 
causes are operating by virtue of the natural forces that shape our 
environment or whether they operate through the deliberate manipulative 
designs of other human agents. (Frankfurt 2002. 28, emphasis added) 
Frankfurt’s point, both here and in his earlier work, is that whether a person has free 
will (or is morally responsible) is not a matter of how one came to be as one is. After 
all, we are inevitably like Mark, or like Andrew, or even like Beth—fashioned by 
circumstances over which we have no control. Whether a person has free will, then, is 
only a matter of what they are like at the time of action, and the threat from 
manipulation fails to take seriously what all of us have in common with manipulated 
agents. 
Before concluding, it is worth taking a moment to consider two potential 
objections to my argument. First, one might maintain that there is a crucial difference 
between cases like Mark’s in which agents are aware of the origins of their 
psychological profiles, on the one hand, and cases of covert manipulation, on the 
other.9 Perhaps acting with freedom of the will requires knowing the origin of one’s 
psychological profile, the objection continues, and this requirement explains the 
difference between cases like Mark’s and cases of covert manipulation. But if this 
objection were to succeed, it would prove too much, for ordinary agents (whom we 
take to act with freedom of the will) do not typically know the ways in which their 
psychological profiles were produced. To be sure, reflective agents recognize that 
they came into existence at an earlier point in time and that they began to make 
decisions and perform actions based on evaluative commitments that were 
influenced by a host of factors (including such things as parental influence, education, 
opportunities/lack of opportunities, etc.), but ordinary agents are not able to 
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determine the exact origins of the various psychological factors that lead them to 
perform specific actions. In fact, Mark’s case is especially interesting because of its 
departure from the norm, so taking that case to exemplify necessary conditions on 
acting with free will would be to create very stringent requirements for so acting. Of 
course, one could take a strong stance here, accepting the implication that ordinary 
agents cannot act with free will, and this leads to the second objection we will 
consider. 
A second potential objection to my argument sees the implications of my view 
for manipulated and designed agents (that they may act with freedom of the will) as a 
reason to doubt the notion of free will at all.10 In particular, one might worry that if 
plausible accounts of freedom of the will (like Frankfurt’s) must admit the freedom of 
manipulated agents, given their similarity to normal (i.e., non-manipulated) agents, 
perhaps we should conclude that even normal agents lack freedom rather than 
attributing freedom to both.11 While this line of response may be tempting, and 
though some have endorsed it, I believe that it places unrealistic demands on freedom 
of the will and thus, ultimately, should not be accepted. According to the objection, to 
act with free will at a certain time t, an agent would have to have had control at some 
past time t’ over what she was like at t. But in order for her to have been free at t’ in 
exercising control over what she was like at t, she would have had to have had control 
at some even earlier time t’’ over what she was like at t’. And so on for eternity past. If 
finite agents like us (in particular, agents who began to exist) are ever to act with free 
will, however, it must be the case that we may do so despite not having total control 
over what we are like at the time of some of our actions. Requiring something like 
total control (or ultimate sourcehood) would be to add an impossible requirement on 
acting with free will, and it is my view that a proper assessment of our own 
limitations should motivate us to reject such stringent demands in favor of more 
modest conditions on acting with free will.12 
6. Conclusion 
I have argued that stories like Egan’s “Reasons to Be Cheerful” provide the resources 
to respond to the main worry for structuralist accounts of free will (like Frankfurt’s). 
Since those accounts say that having a certain psychological structure at the time of 
action is sufficient for having free will, an objection is that an agent may be 
manipulated into having such a psychological structure and would, because 
manipulated, appear unfree. I have argued, however, that we must allow for free will 
even in cases in which a person has no say over how she came to have the character 
she has, and admitting this should lead us to accept that manipulated agents may act 
with free will, contra the manipulation objection. 
In addition to its defense of structuralist accounts of freedom, the argument of 
this paper has important implications for the freedom (and potentially personhood, 
insofar as it is connected with freedom) of artificial intelligences. Recall that, 
according to Frankfurt, “one essential difference between persons and other 
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creatures is to be found in the structure of a person’s will” (Frankfurt 1971, 6). 
Frankfurt’s account of free will is meant to characterize a distinctive feature of 
persons, and, as we have seen, it would be possible for a certain sort of AI (i.e., an AI 
capable of self-awareness and of desiring freedom) to satisfy Frankfurt’s conditions. 
Having been created by another agent does not make a difference, on this view, to the 
freedom or personhood of the created agent; after all, we all began to exist at one 
point or another, and, like an AI, we did not have a say over what we were like when 
we created. Thus, despite the artificiality of an AI that satisfied Frankfurt’s conditions, 
the AI would not be relevantly different from an ordinary agent with respect to its 
freedom and personhood. 
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1 For another type of structuralist account, see Watson (2004). 
2 I focus here on Frankfurt’s initial statement of his view and avoid sketching the details of 
subsequent modifications (none of which would be relevant here anyway). For Frankfurt’s 
more fully developed position, see Frankfurt (1988), and for an excellent discussion and 
extension of the view, see Jaworska (2007). 
3 It is worth noting that such cases of “manipulation” are quite extreme and perhaps distant 
from the sort of thing we would typically call instances of manipulation. I am only interested 
in this more extreme type of manipulation here, but for further discussion of the nature of 
manipulation, see Todd (2013) and Coons and Weber (2014). 
Notes 
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4 For an early version of this objection to Frankfurt’s theory, see Slote (1980). For more 
recent (and widely discussed) versions of the objection, see Fischer and Ravizza (1998) and 
Mele (2006). And note that while some “historicists” offer negative historical conditions like 
the one described in the body of the text (“for a person to act with free will, she must lack a 
history like Beth’s”), some, including Fischer and Ravizza, proffer positive historical 
conditions, according to which an agent is free only if she has a certain sort of history. 
5 See especially Pereboom (2001; 2014) and Mele (2006). 
6 To be causally determined to act as we do by factors beyond our control is typically taken 
to involve (at the very least) the entailment of propositions describing what we do by 
propositions describing the intrinsic state of the world at some time in the distant past and 
propositions expressing the laws of nature. 
7 If a person had control, at some earlier time, over the character from which she now acts 
with free will, then she must have possessed free will at the earlier time, thus making the 
later instance of acting with free will not her first. 
8 This type of response to the manipulation argument has been called the “hard-line” reply, 
as it takes the hard line of granting that manipulated agents may free and even morally 
responsible for what they do. For influential developments of the hard-line response, see 
McKenna (2008) and Fischer (2011), and see Sartorio (2016) for an interesting error theory 
for the initial plausibility of the argument’s first premise. 
9 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this point. 
10 Thanks to another anonymous reviewer for suggesting this objection. 
11 For a similar objection to the possibility of moral responsibility, see Strawson (1994). 
12 For similar responses to the objection to the possibility of moral responsibility, see 
Feinberg (1986, chapter 18) and Fischer (2012, chapter 10). 
 
 
 
 
 
